Scarperation : an empirical inquiry into the role of scarcity in fostering cooperation between international river riparians

The environment and security literature has argued that freshwater scarcity often leads to inter-state conflict, and possibly acute violence. The contention, however, ignores the long history of hydro-political cooperation exemplified by hundreds of documented agreements. Building on a theory that considers the relationship between scarcity and hydro-political cooperation, this paper empirically investigates why treaties are negotiated for some rivers and between some riparians, and not others. The paper suggests that long-term water scarcity has a significant influence on levels of cooperation. Additional variables considered include trade, level of governance among the riparian states, and the geography of the river. Findings confirm that cooperation and scarcity embody a concave (inverted U curve) relationship. Governance has a positive impact on cooperation. In addition, riparians may either arrange the use of their scarce water resources via a treaty or trade (and indirectly exchange [virtual]water). Scarcity, governance, and trade were found to be most salient in explaining levels of cooperation while geography is significant in some of the estimates.Water and Industry,Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions,Environmental Economics&Policies,Town Water Supply and Sanitation,Water Conservation

Efficiency and equity considerations in pricing and allocating irrigation water

Economic efficiency has to do with how much wealth a given resource base can generate. Equity has to do with how that wealth is to be distributed in society. Economic efficiency gets far more attention, in part because equity considerations involve value judgements that vary from person to person. The authors examine both the efficiency and the equity of different methods of pricing irrigation water. After describing water pricing practices in a number of countries, they evaluate their efficiency and equity. In general they find that water use is most efficient when pricing affects the demand for water. The volumetric, output, input, tiered, and two-part tariff schemes all satisfy this condition and can be efficient although whether efficiency is short-run or long-run, first- or second-best, varies. Pricing schemes that do not directly influence water input -- per-unit areas fees for example -- lead to inefficient allocation. But they are usually easier to implement and administer and require less information. The extent to which water pricing methods can effect income redistribution is limited, the authors conclude. Disparities in farm income are mainly the result of factors such as farm size and location and soil quality, but not water (or other input) prices. Pricing schemes that do not involve quantity quotas cannot be used in policies aimed at affecting income inequality. The results somewhat support the view that water prices should not be used to effect income redistribution because water prices are a poor vehicle for reducing income inequality. But pricing schemes that involve water quota rules can reduce income inequality. The authors demonstrate this with a two-rate tiered pricing scheme combined with equal quotas of the cheaper water.Water Conservation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Water and Industry,Drylands&Desertification,Economic Theory&Research,Town Water Supply and Sanitation,Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions,Water Conservation,Water and Industry,Environmental Economics&Policies

The impact of water supply variability on treaty cooperation between international bilateral river basin riparian states

This paper assesses the impact of water supply variability on treaty cooperation between international bilateral river basin riparian states. Climate change is anticipated to change the variability of water supply, as well as its expected magnitude. Previous studies have focused mainlyon water scarcity, measured in terms of mean precipitation or per capita water availability in the country, as a trigger for conflict or cooperation. The water variability measure used here captures both annual runoff variability and precipitation variability over periods of 30 and 100 years. The analysis used economic and international relations data to identify incentives for international cooperation in addressing water supply variability. The authors find that small-to-moderate increases in variability create an impetus for cooperation, although large increases in variability would reduce incentives for treaty cooperation. Stronger diplomatic and trade relations support cooperation, while uneven economic power inhibits cooperation. Various measures of democracy/governance suggest different impacts on cooperation across the basin riparians. The findings have policy implications in the context of preparedness for impacts of climate change on the water sector.Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions,Water and Industry,Town Water Supply and Sanitation,Drought Management,Common Property Resource Development

INFLUENCE OF QUALITY AND SCARCITY OF INPUTS ON THE ADOPTION OF MODERN IRRIGATION TECHNOLOGIES

This article describes the influence of input quality and scarcity, environmental conditions, human capital, water price, and other variables on adoption rates for modern irrigation technologies in terms of both speed and extent of application. An empirical model is developed to apply these relationships to citrus groves in Israel. Results show that modern irrigation technologies tend to be adopted sooner and to a greater extent (a) on groves located on relatively low quality land, (b) in regions with higher evaporation rates, (c) on groves planted with more sensitive rootstock, and (d) on groves grown under conditions of restricted water allotments and higher water prices. Management, human capital, and scale of operation also affect the level and speed of adoption. It is suggested that water prices and quotas can be used to increase adoption.Crop Production/Industries, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

The cost and performance of paid agricultural extension services : the case of agricultural technology transfer in Nicaragua

Budgets for extension services have been reduced in many countries. One response to these reductions in public services in some countries has been to privatize extension services - with extension services provided for a fee, by either public agencies or private companies. Under the new approach, producers become clients instead of beneficiaries. The authors examine ways to measure the cost of providing paid-extension services and its performance and apply these indicators to data on Nicaragua, where paid extension has existed for several years. Data were insufficient to compare the quality of privately and publicly provided extension services, but available data suggest that the costs of extension have declined over time. Results suggest that paid extension is feasible and has a positive impact, even in a relatively poor country such as Nicaragua. The national system for agricultural technology-transfer services was redesigned to include three main modules: mass media and free demonstrations; cofinanced extension services; and private extension services. The relatively high cost recovery rates in Nicaragua and the economic performance of the two paid programs show that even poor farmers are willing to pay for a service that improves their economic efficiency and ability to earn a living. To the surprise of everyone involved, Nicaragua's producer clients understood that without cost-sharing, the system would not endure.ICT Policy and Strategies,Agricultural Knowledge&Information Systems,Environmental Economics&Policies,Enterprise Development&Reform,Montreal Protocol,Agricultural Knowledge&Information Systems,ICT Policy and Strategies,Environmental Economics&Policies,Governance Indicators,General Technology

Water challenge and institutional response (a cross-country perspective)

This cross-country evaluation of institutional responses to problems in the water sector shows that changes in the nature of water problems have changed the development paradigm underlying water institutions. There is increasing recognition of how decentralized allocation mechanisms can influence economic forces and stakeholders in water sector decisions. As the notion of water provision as a public good and welfare activity gives way to the concept of water as an economic good and an input of economic activity, there is more policy concern about efficient and equitable use, cost recovery, and financial viability. All of the countries the authors studied (Australia, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Israel, Mexico, Morocco, South Africa, Spain, and Sri Lanka) are committed to changing the policies and institutions that have caused the present water sector crisis, but they are at different stages of institutional reform. Among cases discussed, Australia and Chile (and, in the United States, California and Colorado) are at an advanced (though not ideal) stage of institutional change. Israel, with its technologically advanced water sector, could well be ahead of them when the proposal to allow water transfers and decentralize water development and distribution systems takes practical shape. Tentative conclusions reached by the authors are: 1) Attempts to fix isolated parts of the water sector will influence other dimensions but an integrated approach is best. At the heart of such an approach should be institutional changes aimed at modernizing and strengthening legal, policy, and administrative arrangements for the whole sector. 2) Institutional changes taking place everywhere suggest that the opportunity costs of (and net gain from) institutional change is not uniform, suggesting that opportunity and transaction costs vary. 3) Funding agencies should focus efforts and resources in countries, areas, and subsectors that already have enough critical mass in institution-building to ensure success and lower transaction costs. 4) The sequence and pace of reform should reflect realities of scale economies and political pressures from reform constituencies. When possible, political economy should be exploited to move reform along more quickly.Environmental Economics&Policies,Water Conservation,Water and Industry,Water Supply and Systems,Decentralization,Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions,Town Water Supply and Sanitation,Water and Industry,Water Conservation,Water Use

Review of integrated approaches to river basin, planning, development and management

Piecemeal approaches to river basin development and management may not fully recognize the interactions and interdependence among components of a river basin system. River basin management that focuses on a single water use, on a single sector, or on the supply to particular segment of the basin population may inadvertently disrupt other sectors of the economy (in time or space). Hence, advocating for a systems approach to river basin development - for models that could help account for a river basin's key components and help address various objectives. The authors review the literature on such economic models, including models that deal with issues of water quality and quantity or with environmental considerations, recreational demand, countrywide planning, and multiple objective planning. Their review may serve as a source of references for those who need to consider whether they can use a model. Readers can evaluate the suitability, advantages, and disadvantages of particular modeling approaches for specific objectives.Water Conservation,River Basin Management,Water and Industry,Environmental Economics&Policies,Decentralization,Environmental Economics&Policies,Water Conservation,Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions,Water and Industry,Town Water Supply and Sanitation

Are stable agreements for sharing international river waters now possible?

International river and lake basins constitute about 47 percent of the world's continental land area, a proportion that increases to about 60 percent in Africa, Asia, and South America. Because water is a scarce and increasingly valuable resource, disputes about water allocation within these basins often contribute to regional tensions and conflicts. May principles of international law have been developed to allocate water within a water basin and to prevent or resolve international water disputes. Unfortunately, they rarely are easy to apply and often are contradictory. Sharing river water is particularly difficult because the effects are one-way, with upstream-downstream supply disputes have been among the most common. Agreements about the allocation of river water often last only until the first drought, when reduced flow denies some their full shares. The authors develop a simple formal model of water allocation among states within a river basin. They analyze the model in the context of variable flow rates, to project the behavior of riparian states during periods of above-normal and below-normal flow. Their objective: to understand when, where, and how much the economic interests of the states conflict, to develop principles guaranteeing efficient allocations of scarce water supplies, and to identify when stable (self-enforcing) allocation agreements are possible. They also consider the possibility of using alternative sources of supply and of accommodating growth in demand. Satellite technology will soon dramatically improve the ability of riparian states to predict annual flow volumes. In addition, water basin authorities will have real-time data on riparians'water use. These developments will have important implications for the enforceability and the flexibility of river water allocation systems. This model shows how flexibility can be used to construct more durable systems for sharing water among riparian states. The new allocation methods proposed here should contribute to the better management of scarce water supplies, a crucial issue in an increasingly thirsty world.Water and Industry,Water Conservation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Water Supply and Systems,Decentralization,Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions,Town Water Supply and Sanitation,Water Conservation,Water and Industry,Environmental Economics&Policies